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ABSTRACT: Davidson’s concept of meaning as truth has many advantages 
in respect of reference and to give an account of how language is used. Its 
complement is the theory of radical interpretation, and both holism and the 
principle of charity complete his notions on semantics. These theses and the very 
idea that meaning depends upon a theory of truth for natural languages that 
is not independent of desires and beliefs are revolutionary in what semantics 
is concerned. Davidson’s use of the concept of truth is a consistent way of 
providing evidence and satisfaction for a sentence, but these concepts are 
restricted to the semantic ground. Observation of the behavior, holism and 
the charitable assumption, evidence and satisfaction are factors that must 
be completed by the acceptance of the propositional content that will give 
an actual role for this sentence in a dialogue. So, the comprehension level 
(semantics) requires a further step in the direction of pragmatic conditions that 
supplies communication with the reasons that produce the acceptance of a 
speech act, its justifi cation, not just its interpretation. In speech real situations, 
the semantic devices operate through pragmatic features.
Key words: meaning, semantics, reference, pragmatics.
RESUMO: O conceito de signifi cado como verdade, proposto por Davidson, tem 
muitas vantagens com respeito à referência e ao modo como a linguagem é usada. 
Seu complemento é a teoria da interpretação radical, os conceitos de holismo e 
de princípio de caridade, que completam suas noções em semântica. Essas teses 
e a própria ideia de que o signifi cado depende de uma teoria da verdade para as 
línguas naturais que não é independente de desejos e crenças são revolucionárias, 
no que concerne a este campo de pesquisa. O uso do conceito de verdade por 
Davidson é um modo consistente de produzir evidência e satisfação para uma 
sentença, mas esses conceitos são restritos ao campo semântico. A observação 
do comportamento, o holismo e a adoção da noção de caridade,  a evidência e a 
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The theory of radical interpretation
How can one understand the meaning of sentences in an unknown language? 
How someone proceeds in order to understand these sentences is a way to investigate 
meaning? The theory of radical interpretation starts with information and this 
information is not the linguistic type. This information contributes to meaning so that 
it can process it. There are facts and situations that are relevant to meaning, but this 
do not implicate a separation between world and language. In this paper we argue 
that there are advantages of the radical interpretation to give new and revolutionary 
account of meaning, truth and the relation between language and facts that are not 
restricted to the epistemological ground, that are not restricted to empiricism and, 
at the same time, it gives an account of reference without a causal theory.
The moves Davidson did begin with a theory of meaning that depends upon 
truth, the next move is radical interpretation and the last move goes towards the 
indeterminacy of meaning and holism.
The advantages of Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation for semantics 
and to give a new account of reference can be summarized as follows: each sentence 
has to be interpreted in an occasion of use; language is not a closed structure; 
meanings are not mental entities; there is a connection between language, events 
and beliefs; reference is possible without reality. 
The restrictions derive from diffi culties that meaning reduced to truth 
conditions produce whenever actual sentences are spoken in dialogue contexts. If 
the obstacles (such as restriction to the sentence, to the semantic level, return to a 
kind of empiricism, and the analysis of sentences separated from one another and 
at the same time mutually related) would be removed, this would provide really 
effi cient conditions in order to go to pragmatics. It is mandatory that context, 
dialogue between speakers, situation, as Davidson himself points are present, but 
if they are submitted to the holism principle what is lost is radical interpretation of 
a sentence. And if the meaning of each sentence has to be taken into consideration 
as Davidson claims, what is lost is holism. Only a pragmatic level, the discourse level, 
gives conditions to surpass this dilemma. There is another diffi culty, how, by what 
means can the hearer know he has the right interpretation of the meaning of the 
speaker’s sentence? The principle of charity, if it answers this question, it provokes 
other diffi culties that its core notion carries, the notion of “rationality”.
Positive aspects of the radical interpretation 
theory in relation to reference and meaning
We will list some advantages of this theory to a better understanding of issues 
in language philosophy. Radical interpretation is a theory that takes language and 
satisfação são fatores que precisam ser completados pela aceitação do conteúdo 
proposicional que atribuirá um papel real para uma sentença em um diálogo. 
Assim, o nível de compreensão (semântica) requer um passo a mais na direção de 
condições pragmáticas que sustentem a comunicação por meio das razões que 
produzem a aceitação de um ato de fala e de sua justifi cativa, não apenas de sua 
interpretação. Nas situações de fala reais, os recursos semânticos operam através 
de recursos pragmáticos.
Palavras-chave: signifi cado, semântica, referência, pragmática.
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communication into consideration (semantics instead of epistemic vision). Davidson main 
theses on the role of language and communication, namely the radical interpretation, 
the charity assumption and the very idea that meaning depends upon a theory of truth 
for natural languages that is not independent of desires and beliefs, are revolutionary 
in what semantics is concerned. He uses the concept of truth for closed sentences with 
support both on formal features for natural languages and on the knowledge of an 
interpreter of the conditions of true that are held by a speaker. This is the most consis-
tent way of providing evidence and satisfaction for a sentence so that the sentence has 
a meaning, that is, it can be understood, interpreted. Davidson rejects the traditional 
correspondence theory of truth because this theory does not take language into 
consideration. Only sentences can be true or false, but this is not a property of sentences, 
there is no direct connection with the empirical facts. His conception of philosophy of 
language is a pure one in the sense that Rorty (1979) states. Davidson rejects all sorts 
of foundationalism. In opposition to the impure language philosophy, that requires a 
conception of reference that provides a connection between language and reality, the 
pure philosophy of language does not require a theory of reference, as we will show 
ahead. The assumption that it is necessary to solve the problem of reference concerns 
a conception of epistemology previous to the linguistic turn.
The problem of how names and sentences describe state of affairs is no more a 
central problem after the pragmatic turn, particularly after Wittgenstein’s conception 
of language games and after the holism of Quine (1999, p. 71-72). What matters 
is how the speakers can confront their sentences and the situations in the world, 
and this is not just a property of the assertions. The assertive sentences are one 
kind of sentence among others, with no more a privileged position. With the new 
perspective of the analytic philosophy, Quince’s epistemological behaviorism, and 
Davidson’s radical interpretation, it is, as Rorty (1979) says, the very epistemological 
culture that is abandoned. The request of correspondence between language and 
facts is a factor of speech in dialogue situation and not a mind’s representation. “In 
Davidson’s view, the question of ‘how language works’ has no special connection 
with the question of ‘how knowledge works’ [...] A theory of meaning, for Davidson, 
is not an assemblage of ‘analyses’ of the meaning of individual terms, but rather 
an understanding of the inferential relations between sentences” (Rorty, 1979, p. 
259-260). These relations can be understood just how are understood the truth-
conditions for simple sentences, they are of the simple and uncontroversial kind of 
“the snow is white”. But sentences for beliefs or those that introduce an adverb, 
or sentences that cannot be related by the simple conditions of other related 
sentences, their truth conditions are not trivial, their testability depends upon other 
sentences’ truth-conditions that are part of a larger theory. This new way of treating 
meaning and interpretation has no metaphysical implications, and their bonds to 
epistemological conditions are not rigid. In other words, Davidson’s philosophy of 
language is a pure one, as Rorty (1979) says, it is free from the “mirror-imagery” 
and from the ‘scheme-content’ distinction. Language does not depend on facts 
for it does not represent reality. Rorty (1979) agrees with Davidson’s rejection of 
the correspondence theory that requires the construction of a language capable of 
linking truth and reality. “Correspondence for Davidson is a relation which has no 
ontological preferences – it can tie any sort of word with any sort of thing” (Rorty, 
1979, p. 300). To have true beliefs, for example, on morals does not implicate that 
the world must contain a certain belief or not. Truth must not be divorced from 
meaning, and this is what happens (a divorce) if one adopts the correspondence 
theory (“mirror imagery”) or the “scheme-content” theory. The question is no 
more how we connect world and language, but what we can do with language, 
and an isolated sentence and its truth-conditions is a dimension where we cannot 
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fi nd language interactions. Davidson is not concerned with “what is the case” (for 
isolated sentences), but with someone’s language, his previous theory and the 
passing theory that this person will use in order to interpret each sentence. Then, 
and only then, the adequate truth-conditions will be fulfi lled. “There are no magic 
ties between words and things, but interpretation schemes that depend upon a 
community of speakers and, sometimes, even upon just one speaker” (Araújo, 2004, 
p. 198). Heal (1979, p. 178) explains that 
meaning is a public and observable property of certain sounds, marks or movements, 
but a non-physical one. So the concept of meaning is a descriptive and factual one, and 
also, very importantly, a basic observational one [...] It belongs to a different but equally 
fundamental area of thinking, namely the one we use in our relations with other persons. 
There is a relation between sentences, speakers, and data, for, as stresses 
Davidson, “a theory of truth must treat truth as an attribute of utterances that 
depends (perhaps among other things) on the sentence uttered, the speaker and the 
time (1991, p. 213). This conception of meaning has many advantages: semantics 
must take into consideration the use of sentences by speakers in a certain occasion; 
each sentence has to be interpreted in an occasion of use, in a specifi c situation 
and meaning is provided through truth conditions that are relative to the situation. 
To Davidson there is no contradiction between Wittgenstein and Tarski, natural 
language is at the same time fl exible and requires semantic interpretation that can 
be formalized. There is no way to arrive to the private language or to someone’s 
thought. The controversy realism/antirealism makes no sense.
There are reasons that rationalizes the action, and this explains “the relation 
between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the 
agent’s reason for doing what he did” (Davidson, 1980, p. 3). We must pay attention 
to the reasons a person has and not to the epistemological issue that the relation 
between subject and object arises.
Another advantage is that it considers that language has not a closed 
structure of syntactic rules, for it is a matter of social practice. With this idea 
Davidson is in the opposite side of Chomsky, whose main thesis (internalism) is 
that language is not a kind of social practice. The way reference is produced is a 
matter of language faculty, that is, of brain structure, and how to use it is not a 
matter of culture or behavior features, it is a matter of cognitive features that are 
explained as biological function, whose evidence is provided by natural sciences. 
He criticizes Davidson’s argument that an interpreter gives to each sentence that 
is expressed for each person in each situation, an interpretation, there is nothing 
like a linguistic competence in Davidson’s view. This way of thinking criticizes 
Chomsky, involves too many factors, it is impossible to make empirical sense of 
well-succeeded communication because it is too much complex. The very notion 
of a passing theory is not a useful one, because they are theories built for each 
situation, they have no invariable elements, so it is not possible to make profi table 
investigation. “[...] The interpreter as Davidson conceives it includes everything 
available to human intelligence; it makes no sense, however, to call its transient 
states ‘theories’ or to consider them a subject of direct inquiry” (Chomsky, 2000, 
p. 70). This holism is quite mysterious, Chomsky says. 
We do not agree with Chomsky’s critiques, for Davidson’s externalism is much 
more profi table than the empiric and biological Chomsky’s conception of language2. 
2 For more information on my critical approach to Chomsky, see “Do signo ao Discurso” (Araújo, 2008 p. 
184-194). 
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There is a third advantage: a theory of meaning characterized by truth that 
takes use and situation into consideration. This theory of truth has no connection 
with metaphysical assumptions. It must determinate how the speakers of a language 
can determinate the meaning or the meanings of an expression. It is necessary that 
this theory can characterize a truth predicate. This might not be the only criterion, 
but it is the best criterion for the semantic of a natural language. Davidson is aware 
of the diffi culties for providing meaning for subjunctive sentences, or for those that 
have to do with probability, causal relations, the functioning of adverbs, mass terms, 
belief sentences and intention sentences. 
A correspondence theory that links sentence and facts is not good enough 
for it does not take into account language. Assertions are true or false because 
words are used in these assertions, “and it is words that have interesting, detailed, 
conventional connections with the world. Any serious theory of truth must 
therefore deal with these connections, and it is here if anywhere that the notion of 
correspondence can fi nd some purchase”, says Davidson (1991, p. 43). The truth 
of a sentence depends upon connections between the sentence, the speakers and 
the world (data). Language is connected to occasions for truth, that is, to the 
construction of a theory that also satisfi es the characteristics of closed sentences 
(which entities satisfy the variables and which entities are included). The problem 
is how to transport a truth theory to a natural language since a natural language 
does not require formalization and the semantic method is not capable, alone, to 
explain the use of the adverb, the subjunctive mode, reported speech, imperatives.
Davidson looks for a semantic theory that can account the changing of the 
sentence due to the prepositional attitudes of a speaker or to the occasion of use. 
Truth will not be a property of sentences, nor is provided exclusively by the use 
of a speech act. It has to do with the possibility of fi nding a theory that makes a 
certain sentence true in that occasion and that satisfi es a certain speaker. In this 
case, there is a theory that interprets correctly a sentence. This is Davidson’s theory 
of radical interpretation. To interpret it is necessary to know the meaning of each 
meaningful expression, and this must be done independently of meaning itself and 
of opened behavior. Language serves to interests and activities that are not linguistic 
ones through sentences that must be interpreted in terms of beliefs and intentions 
that make sense just in a whole. This does not imply that each and every sentence 
of a language has an interpretation. There is no such a thing like the language. 
Interpretation requires just the skillfulness to deal with the semantic features to 
translate the unknown language in familiar words that satisfy that interpretation. 
An utterance will or will not have the property of truth and so it will have its own 
interpretation in connection with the basic attitudes of the speakers. “Truth is single 
property which attaches, or fail to attach, to utterances, while each utterance has 
its own interpretation; and truth is more apt to connect with fairly simple attitudes 
of speakers” (Davidson, 1991, p. 134). 
Davidson is not interested in the improvement of natural languages. The 
canonical notations have the role of exploiting the structure of natural languages. The 
theory of truth transforms the sentences of natural language into formal language, 
and he uses Tarki’s method. The true for items of a fi nite vocabulary is the basis to 
characterize true for an infi nite number of sentences. The criterion of satisfaction 
implies that sentences and expressions can be related to objects in the world. Each 
sentence ‘s’ of the object language must entail that ‘s’ is true if and only if ‘p’, and 
‘p’ can be replaced by any sentence that is true if and only if ‘s’ is true. To Davidson 
evidence is enough, and interpretation depends upon T-sentences that provide 
information because they belong to a theory with its formal properties and empirical 
restrictions. This is why there must be cooperation between beliefs and meaning. 
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If one knows the conditions that provide truth to sentences and their meaning one 
can infer the speaker’s belief. The interpreter deals with these assumptions on the 
speaker’s attitude, he can take a sentence as truth, not just for truth assertions 
but also for orders, requests, ironies, lies. These are also attitudes that can reveal 
if a speaker takes his sentences as true, in that occasion, in that circumstance and 
for that speaking community, giving evidence and certain assumptions to improve 
interpretation. 
This is what happens when someone applies a truth theory to an unknown 
language, making arrangements in his logic in order to obtain a satisfactory theory 
to the unknown language, adjusting beliefs to meanings and applying the charitable 
assumption. That is, the assumption that others have rationality, certain patterns 
and beliefs, not completely strange to our own way to attribute truth to behaviors 
and beliefs. Behind all this there is a formal theory of truth that “imposes a complex 
structure on sentences containing the primitive notions of truth and satisfaction”, says 
Davidson (1991, p. 137) that will be supported by evidence. So Davidson reconciles the 
need of a structure that is articulated in semantic terms with a theory whose sentences 
are testable, but not the theory itself. “By knowing only the conditions under which 
speakers hold sentences true, we can come out, given a satisfactory theory, with an 
interpretation of each sentence” (Davidson, 1991, p. 137).
The fourth advantage of the radical interpretation is that it allows the critique 
of the conception of meanings as entities, rejection of internalize and relativism, 
adoption of holism. Meaning comes from the possibilities to say under what 
conditions the utterance of a sentence is truth. Meaning is not just a question of 
truth conditions, we can say that the T-sentence ‘The snow is white’ is true if and 
only if the grass is green or 2+2=4. The true conditions for a sentence depend 
upon the true conditions for other sentences of a language as a whole. It is just in 
connection with other sentences that a sentence will have a role. As Davidson (1991, 
p. 139) explains, “the totality of T-sentences should […] optimally fi t evidence about 
sentences held true by native speakers”. What Tarski took as a necessity to each 
sentence Davidson takes as a condition that is extended to language that works in 
a whole, so each sentence will be adequately interpreted for it is a part of a theory 
that supplies with formal and empirical criteria each empiric sentence. Tarski goes 
from meaning to truth and Davidson inverts this way. 
Even so indeterminacy exists because the adjustment of beliefs of a speaker 
and the interpretation of his word is not exact, but it is suffi cient to fi lter theories 
adequate to interpretation. So beliefs and meanings are complementary factors 
for the interpretation of each speech. A linguistic behavior is interpreted when 
we can say what the words mean at an occasion of use. As there are other factors 
(linguistic, philosophical, psychological), to know if a sentence is true will require 
tests for its empiric implications, the kind of test that every competent speaker can 
do. The theory that interprets a sentence can be correct, but to make it evident that 
the interpretation of that sentence in that occasion, made by a speaker is correct, 
it is necessary to take into account the beliefs, intentions, desires, approvals and 
convention. But meaning cannot be based just on uses, intentions, purposes, no-
linguistics functions, as Mead, Dewey, Wittgenstein and Grice sustain. Davidson thinks 
that language cannot be abstracted from social factors and from social context. 
Meanings, reference, synonym, words and sentences are part of our primitive data 
that are organized by intuitive theories. But this is not enough to explain how is 
given the correct interpretation of an utterance. How can one understand that 
those words are an exhortation for someone to give up smoking? Certainly it is not 
because of an interior thought. To understand someone’s intentions and beliefs is 
not independent of understanding his utterances. Radical interpretation requires at 
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the same time a theory of meaning and of belief. Each utterance provides recognition 
of a prepositional attitude in that occasion plus certain exterior circumstances that 
give support or not to that attitude. People choose according to their preferences, 
based upon a “decision theory and interpretation theory” (Davidson, 1991, p. 
147). Taking a sentence as true involves a belief that it is true, and the decision 
between propositions taken as true, is basis for evidence. The preference for the 
utterance of a sentence and not for the utterance of another is explained by the 
theory that attributes beliefs and values to the agent and meaning to his words. 
A theory of interpretation can be based on behavioral or dispositional facts. So, to 
understand an utterance “it is necessary to construct a comprehensive theory for 
the interpretation of a potential infi nity of utterances” (Davidson, 1991, p. 148). 
The evidence for the interpretation of each utterance is the same to interpret all 
his sentences and the sentences of a community. The correct interpretation of a 
theory requires meanings, propositions, beliefs that have a role in the construction 
of that theory. This common vision comes from the “recognition that sentences 
held true – the linguistic representatives of belief – determine the meanings of the 
words they contain” (Davidson, 1991, p. 201).
Davidson says that Quine inspired him in these issues, but instead of the 
translation manual sentence to sentence and the confrontation with information 
that has to do with empirical restrictions, Davidson employs a semantic theory 
and goes beyond for he takes into account the ontological richness of language 
and that shows how the elements of the natural language, demonstrative adverb 
for instance, can make the theory of truth relative to time and speaker. Formal, 
natural, cultural factors are not independent. Tarski considers the T-sentences but 
just on a syntactic point of view. Davidson thinks that truth takes to the meaning 
of a sentence. It matters the way T-sentences yield interpretation. The main factor is 
the extension of the application of predicates, so that to establish truth conditions 
is equivalent to give the meaning of the sentence of the object language. Without 
this guarantee, there is no interpretation. The formal semantic level requires just 
the normal pattern of quantifi cation structures that follows the satisfaction criteria 
of the semantic structures, though its relation with superfi cial grammar is very 
complex. The language object is projected into a quantifi cation theory, and so it is 
possible to identify the semantic features of a sentence.
In order to interpret the predicate of the object language in a meta-language, 
the ontological relativity will cause no problem because the truth theory will provide 
T-sentences that will give correct interpretation through reasonable and sure 
restrictions. There will be also empirical restrictions, the facts under which speakers 
take sentences of their language as true, sentences that are neutral in respect to 
beliefs and meanings. Data can provide tests for the acceptability of T-sentences. 
The truth of a sentence depends upon circumstances that confi rm not only the 
generalizations, but also the T-sentences. All these vary with the speaker and with 
the occasion in which the speaker sustain the truth of a sentence, under certain 
circumstances.
This support is given when sentences are true according to a theory and to 
a speaker’s theory, with his vision of the facts. So, there are modifi cations on the 
inference of certain sentences. But in the construction of a theory there are formal 
restrictions that interfere in the decision of which T-sentence is adequate to the 
sentence of the object language.
The theory does not require that speakers can always sustain the truth of a 
theory nor require that errors can be eliminated. The theory requires the background 
of an agreement in which errors and disputes can be interpreted. Davidson (1991, 
p. 153) says: “making sense of an utterance and behavior of others, even their most 
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aberrant behavior, requires us to fi nd a great deal of reason and truth in them”. The 
assumption is that language needs a background of shared beliefs. If we cannot 
understand someone’s attitude it is because we do not have the skillfulness to 
understand in what respect it is not reasonable. Communication almost always 
is made after agreement in simple questions. The problematic questions must be 
interpreted based on the attitudes of a speaker, and the attribution of beliefs and 
different interpretations. At the community level, this diffi culty does not occur with 
frequency, it is possible to separate what is idiosyncratic from what is taken as true 
or false based upon public patterns. There is indeterminacy of translation, in the 
sense of Quine, but, in the other hand, there is the semantic counterpart of the 
indeterminacy of interpretation, that is compensated by the charitable principle. 
It has a general basis and is sustained “because the uniqueness of quantifi cational 
structure is apparently assured if convention T is satisfi ed” (Davidson, 1991, p. 153). 
Indeterminacy causes no problem, without it, it would be not necessary to interpret 
the speech considering simultaneously the interpretation of the action. The same 
happens with the attribution of beliefs and desires. 
Each interpretation and attribution of attitude is a move within a holistic coherence 
theory, a theory necessarily governed by concern for consistency and general with 
the truth, and it is this that sets these theories forever apart from those that describe 
mindless objects, or describe objects as mindless (Davidson, 1991, p. 154).
As the interpretation of a sentence is independent of its use (against 
Wittgenstein), this allows the interpreter to understand an utterance by the 
descriptions of the attitudes of other people. Davidson (1991, p. 169) says that 
What must be counted in favor of a method of interpretation is that it puts the inter-
preter in general agreement with the speaker: according to the method, the speaker 
holds a sentence true under specifi ed conditions and these conditions obtain, in the 
opinion of the interpreter, just when the speaker holds the sentence to be true.
There is no perfect theory to put both in agreement: sometimes the theory is 
mistaken. The best theory is the one that makes the agreement the best as possible. 
A community of language has theories in common and they make the agreement 
and the understanding good enough for this community survival. Language is 
shaped by the shared vision, so to study general aspects of language is also to study 
general aspects of reality.
The distinction between a true sentence (objectively) and holding a sentence 
true makes sense only in an interpretation theory. The beliefs have an important 
role, they provide public norms of acceptance. There is no private mind. Only those 
who interpret can have a concept of thought. True and false beliefs are given in 
the context of an interpretation and this conducts to the idea of a public objective 
truth. Davidson avoids at the same time relativism and foundationalism.
As a fi fth advantage there is the notion that language has connection with 
reality without reference. One of the most original contributions of Davidson is his 
critic on the concept of scheme/content that we can fi nd in Whorf, Kuhn and Quine. 
If we conceive that there is a difference between language and conceptual schemes, 
this will take us to the strange idea of a mind with an organizational structure. This 
is a clear and important advantage of Davidson’s theory of interpretation it does not 
imply a mind that apprehend reality in one side, and languages that distort reality 
on the other side. To translate from one language to another there are problems, 
but none of them unsurpassable. Davidson believes that meaning is contaminated 
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by theory, that is, by what one holds as true. If one gets rid of the idea of scheme/
content (the third dogma of empiricism) one can get rid of any sort of empiricism. 
The idea that language organizes the world depends upon the idea that there are 
neutral schemes. This the assumption behind Kuhn and Feyerabend’s theses of 
incommensurable systems of concepts provided by nature’s neutral contents. Quine 
says that the frontier of a theory grasps experience, and the scientifi c conceptual 
scheme is the adequate tool for this task. They all conceive language as associated 
to a conceptual scheme and being it or not translatable, there is in a certain relation 
between nature (it predicts, organizes, adapts, faces), and experience (or reality, 
sensory promptings). The problem is: what is this reality and which entities are 
related. This vision of language as responsible for the organization of the world, 
language as predicting and facing the tribunal of experience, fi ts with the conception 
that separates reality in one side and experience (data, sense data, stimuli) on the 
other side. Davidson says that just objects can be organized and every language 
can be translated in a more basic language. Language does not organize all the 
experience. There are parts of it that agree with familiar principles. In other words, 
there is a difference between dealing with reality and organizing reality through 
conceptual schemes. Davidson agrees just with the fi rst thesis. What really matters are 
the sentences that predict something, deal with things, fi x our sensory promptings 
and can be compared to other sentences. It is the sentences as a whole that face 
the tribunal of experience. Davidson disagrees with the idea that the substance of 
the language is made with sensory data, experience or surface irritations. It is a 
theory as a whole that makes arrangements, fi ts the sensory evidence, says Quine. 
The problem is that the agreement with experience, with facts, must be the truth 
of facts and this “adds nothing intelligible to the simple concept of being true” 
(Davidson, 1991, p. 194). There is nothing outside (in reality) with what to contrast. 
A sentence is true if the truth conditions are those required as the case, and this 
does not require reference to the facts, to the world, to the experience.
Using the concept of truth Davidson avoids the troubles of testing a different 
conceptual scheme. If there are two different schemes, they must be compared with 
reality that is common to the incommensurable schemes, criticizes Davidson. He 
abandoned the metaphor of a unique space with schemes that have a position and 
provide a point of view. He proposes translation with some errors, partial failures, 
that one can change and contrast with conceptual schemes in an intelligible way, 
referring them to a common part. He does not appeal to meanings, concepts, beliefs 
that are shared. There is interdependency between beliefs and meanings because 
there is a mutual dependency between the two aspects of the linguistic behavior, 
the attribution of beliefs and the interpretation of sentences. These relations of 
dependency provide the association between conceptual schemes and languages. 
But there is more: someone’s speech can be interpreted just by someone who knows 
enough of some of the speakers’ beliefs and the sharp distinctions between these 
beliefs are not possible without the comprehension of the speech. The theory gives 
account of attitudes and interpretation of the speech without assuming any of them. 
Quine accepts basic evidences for a theory of interpretation, but Davidson accepts 
T-sentences and interpretations that are provided by a malleable theory of meaning 
and an acceptable theory of belief. “[...] the process is that of constructing a viable 
theory of belief and meaning from sentences held true” (Davidson, 1991, p. 196).
Anomalies can be interpreted in function of a common background and by 
the effi cient condition: the speaker holds sentences as true and act according to this. 
The criteria are simplicity, common sense and capacity to detect or explain errors. 
And also: sharing of sentences held as true; theories that are easy to manipulate 
and follow the charitable principle. There is rationality in thought and thoughts have 
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propositional contents. They are in causal relation with the world. The assumption 
is a good disposition to understand other people. Disagreement will always exist. In 
short, in order to have communication it will be necessary the charitable principle 
and formal conditions of a theory. That is, a shared vision of the world largely true. 
There are different schemes, adaptation, and differences of opinion. Davidson 
avoids relativism for sentences are relative just to a language, and this is as objective 
as possible. He does not give up the world. There is an immediate contact with 
it through familiar objects whose peculiarities make our sentences true or false. 
Reality without reference is a conception that avoids the problem of the building 
block theory. This conception presupposes the immediate contact between words 
and the world. This empiricism is not sustainable, as Quine already showed. It is 
the sentence and not its parts that enable the relation between speakers, the words 
and the world. Each word has or not reference in a sentence. So reference cannot 
be explained directly in nonlinguistic terms. This is the reason why Davidson does 
not agree with Quine’s conception of inscrutability of reference and indeterminacy 
of translation. Quine says that we have to build manuals for the translation from 
sentence to sentence and so we can know nothing considering just the relation 
between words and objects. We know to what words refer but this is of no help 
for the translation manuals. The reference paradox is that this is a syntactic issue 
and reference does not count in this ground. 
Davidson says that the building block theory would be fi ne if we could give 
a nonlinguistic account of reference, what is not possible. So he prefers the holistic 
method that takes into account the sentence. Language will be connected to the 
behavior that is described in nonlinguistic terms, although the behavior is not capable 
of giving account of the semantic aspects of parts of sentences. If we cannot give such 
an account, we cannot explain truth. The extension of the concept of truth goes to a 
certain language with its fi xed vocabulary. The basic semantic structure is not the basis 
to interpret a theory, because the explanation through a theory provides satisfaction, 
and to explain the theory requires the application of truth to closed sentences that 
are then, connected to human activity. The requirements for a theory of truth (words, 
meaning, reference, satisfaction) must not need empiric confi rmation. The speaker 
assumes the truth of the T-sentence as evidence, constructs a similar theory and 
tests the rest of the T-sentences in order to confi rm or add something, adapting 
it to the appropriate circumstances. Radical interpretation purifi es the situation 
in an artifi cial way. It comes “from the scratch”. So, reference and satisfaction are 
resources to establish the truth conditions without direct confrontation with reality. 
The correspondence to facts does not need a reference theory. Reference “assigns 
no empirical content directly to relations between names or predicates and objects. 
These relations are given a content indirectly when the T-sentences are” (Davidson, 
1991, p. 223). Davidson overlaps the metaphysical conception of representation, the 
Cartesian conception of a mind that knows the objects directly through representation, 
a sort of “spiritual photograph” of the world. Reference without the empirical ties 
does not imply giving away ontology and semantics. At each time someone uses a 
name that is satisfi ed by an entity (the same happens with predicates) there will be 
satisfaction and reference, just in order to establish truth. The way expressions satisfy 
the truth conditions of a sentence are relative to the speaker and situation because 
the theory of truth for a language L requires information and knowledge adequate 
to the interpretation of a speech of L. Empirical and formal restrictions are required 
to determine the role of each sentence, that is, its meaning and its interpretation 
among other pattern sentences of the language. 
Different theories of truth assign different truth conditions to the same 
sentence. Instead of connecting sentence to something extra linguistic, Davidson 
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stresses that the sole basic requirement is the possibility of interpretation. In other 
words, the basic requirement is “[...] to expect to fi nd a minimum of information 
about the correctness of the theory at each single point” (Davidson, 1991, p. 225). 
The relation between language and reality does not require reference to objects. 
Instead it requires the sentence structure with its terms, predicates, connectives and 
quantifi ers that have the usual ontological implications. The source of objectivity 
is intersubjectivity.
Ontology is not relative as Quine claims. This is the last item we list as an 
advantage for a better account of meaning and reference. Quine argues that there is 
no way to know for sure what a singular term refers to, nor what a predicate is true 
for, based upon the observation of the behavior. Davidson proposes different and 
alternative schemes of reference. If one of them fi ts the possible relevant evidence, 
then the other schemes will do too. Quine proposes that the relation between objects 
and words is connected to a scheme of reference (translation manual). Davidson 
accepts both theses of indeterminacy of translation and inscrutability of reference, 
with one important difference: it is the reference that is relative, not the ontology. It 
is just within a fi xed ontology that makes sense the operation of connecting words 
and things in different ways so to explain the truth of sentences. 
The charitable principle works when there is a theory of truth (a manual of 
translation) that satisfi es the truth conditions and makes every sentence of the 
language true or false. In the case of two satisfactory theories that differ to account 
which singular term, predicate or quantifi er will work, Tarski’s theory must be applied. 
There is also the possibility that even with a given vocabulary and a fi xed logic form, 
theories differ in reference that is assigned to the same names and phrases. The total 
ontology varies up to a certain level. Reference demands always the context of a 
truth theory. In order to assign the extension of terms and predicates, it is necessary 
quantifi ers and functions. Reference is in the scope of satisfaction that deals with 
a defi nition of truth for closed sentences. 
A speaker has an attitude towards a situation or objective event and responds 
giving attention to the utterance of the sentence, so that reference is relative to this 
situation but not ontology. To make sense it is necessary to report to the occasion and 
to the object. Quine thinks that this is relative to a back language that is constituted 
of behavior as response to stimuli. To Davidson, reference works in a language in 
relation to points that are demanded in order to understand an utterance. Reference 
is malleable, inscrutable but this does not imply ontological relativity. There is this 
already mentioned difference between explanation through a theory and look for 
evidence to show that the theory is true to some speaker or community. A theory 
is true because of the structure of its sentences, so it is the sentence and its truth 
that are connected with the world and not the relation between word and object. 
Even when there is a causal relation between word and object, the theory can be 
tested just at the sentence level. The way sentences are visualized provides evidence 
to make a theory of reference true to a speaker. Reference keeps inscrutable even 
if one knows the scheme to combine words and objects, because there is not a 
criterion for the choice of a determined scheme instead of another one. 
This causal theory of reference is based on a theory of truth that is testable 
by the reactions of the speakers. The schemes of reference have in common the true 
conditions for all the sentences of a community and his causal or patterned ways of 
making connections. The schemes differ because the extension of their predicates 
differs, and the interpretation is not related to a certain reference, but to what the 
speaker means or refers to when he uses a word or a sentence. 
This defl ationist conception is in neat advantage in respect of epistemology 
conceptions of proof, empirical tests or the confrontation mind/reality. A scheme 
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of reference says nothing about ontology, about what is a certain object. It is the 
interpretation that says what words are being used to refer in a certain way and with 
a certain language. This malleability is very effi cient and it does not imply easiness, 
ambiguity or multiplication of points of view. Truth and reference are relative to a 
language in which sentences are true and words do refer. The same sentence can 
have two opposite truth conditions, so one has to adjust language and the scheme 
to provide another truth condition to give meaning to the sentence through the 
observation of the speakers open behavior or his attitudes towards the sentence. 
Davidson’s holism is the assumption that language is part of the human activities, 
of our dealing with the world and with one another. To share a world and be logical 
is enough for radical interpretation.
The restrictions of the theory of radical 
interpretation considering the pragmatic turn
These theses represent a considerable progress in the philosophy of language 
for they avoid the naïve conception of epistemology based upon a theory of 
reference as correspondence between words and things. In Davidson’s view beliefs 
are connected with meanings and vice versa. Their truth depends upon the occasion 
of use. But there are also restrictions in the theory of radical interpretation, some 
of them derived from the very qualities we reported above. 
The fi rst restriction: Davidson’s investigation is limited to the semantic ground. 
Although his conception of philosophy of language can be classifi ed among the 
current pragmatism, his semantics is constructed by means of one assumption: 
meaning depends upon truth. This restriction to the semantic ground provides him 
with a consistent theory of meaning based on two branches: truth and interpretation. 
This is the strong point of Davidson’s philosophy of language. Unfortunately this 
is in other aspects its weakness. His analysis of language is limited to the closed 
sentence and its basic formal semantic structure. The semantic level matches with 
closed sentences and it is not possible to think in semantic terms in a different way. 
And here lies a dilemma: to give a correct account of communication, the semantic 
level is not enough for reasons we will provide next. But to understand a sentence 
the semantic structure is suffi cient for the reasons Davidson correctly gives, if we 
agree with such a conception3. How can we possibly understand a sentence without 
knowing what is it true about? And how recognize true without the possibility of 
examining truth conditions that a speaker held that is interpreted by what he says 
in that occasion, with that intention and reported to that belief or desire? To satisfy 
all these aspects the semantic level is necessary but it is not enough. Davidson’s 
analysis is adequate to sentences and each sentence’s meaning is constructed with 
its components. The diffi culty rests not on the semantic level, but in restricting 
understanding and communication to this level (closed sentence and its relations). 
Extensional analysis and minimal logical resources of natural languages are requisites 
that are good enough to the semantic analysis’ level. But in order to understand 
one another, in order to justify beliefs, the speakers have to deal with conditions 
that surpass this level.
3 It is not our purpose to criticize Davidson’s semantic of truth conditions for sentences in this paper. Habermas 
thinks that this kind of philosophy of language is still tied to the assertive function. The assertion is the paradigm 
to all the other linguistic uses. Following Habermas, there has to be an internal connection between the 
expositive function and the pragmatic conditions that made communication successful. For further discussion 
see  “Wharheit und Rechtfertigung, philosophishe aufsätze” (Habermas, 1999).
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So, one may not stop at this level if one is supposed to understand how 
communication works in normal speech situations. The speech situation is richer, it 
involves other speech acts, other language games that are arranged by rules that 
go beyond the propositional content and that are related to many other factors 
that have nothing to do with truth conditions. Even when Davidson is concerned 
with the speaker and the interpreter, the point in focus is the sentence and its 
propositional content. If an interpreter has to know the truth conditions held by 
the speaker, their agreement depends on suppositions about beliefs and desires 
of the speaker. But, how the interpreter knows what true conditions exactly are 
those required to provide evidence? Observation of the behavior, holism and the 
charitable assumption provide no adequate answers to solve these questions. The 
charitable principle says that the agreement is the best as possible for each occasion. 
Even so, there are other factors that Davidson does not take into consideration, 
as the possibility of arguing in favor or against something or some purpose. The 
requisite that satisfi es these discourse claims are not provided by a semantic 
of truth and interpretation, but by a discourse conception of truth based upon 
justifi cation and not just upon empiric evidence. Evidence and satisfaction must be 
completed by the acceptance of the propositional content that will give an actual 
role to this sentence in a dialogue situation. To arrive to the comprehension level 
it is required a further step in the direction of pragmatic conditions to show how, 
why, what are the reasons that produce the acceptance of a speech act and not 
just the understanding of the meaning (holding truth). The propositional content is 
questioned, rejected, denied etc. by speakers. In speech real situations, there is not 
just the utterance of a sentence, but a linguistic action, where the semantic devices 
operate through pragmatic features. Davidson’s pragmatism, paradoxically, does 
not satisfy discourse and pragmatics conditions. Discourse is a practice that involves 
not just intention, propositional attitudes, events and actions. These conditions 
have to provide validation. The semantic devices (with the propositional content 
of sentences) are necessary to know what conditions are necessary to connect to 
reality, to the world. It satisfi es Davidson’s claim of the triangulation between the 
speaker, the sentence and the world. But the semantic devices cannot be based just 
on evidence or coherence. There must be justifi ed reasons provided by dialogue.
As a second restriction we point out that the theory must be verifi ed and 
its truth conditions must be reported to empiric reality. Jane Heal argues that this 
dualism or its opposite, a reductionism to materialistic accounts, are points of view 
not compatible to Davidson’s concept of radical interpretation. Davidson does not 
mean with this idea the same thing as the traditional empiricism does, nor the 
theory requires the relation sentence/state of affairs. Even so, some kind of proving 
and testing are necessary in order to know what a sentence is about, what a certain 
behavior or belief are about, what a speaker’s intention is about. For Davidson the 
criterion is evidence and empiric conditions that may, after all, correspond to the 
world. There is another side that Davidson did not grasp, the side of discourse and 
hermeneutics. Dialogue situation and speakers who interpret are conditions that 
rely not just on coherence and not just based on a theory that can provide evidence 
and say something of the world. These claims are fair and necessary but there is 
more. One must ask what for a sentence is being used in real situations. Davidson 
recognizes that this is an essential requisite, but the interpretation is possible under 
a theory that is tested at each use of a sentence. The interpreter must know “the 
conditions under which utterances of sentences are true, and often that if certain 
sentences are true, others must be” (Davidson, 1991, p. 158). We think that truth 
conditions did not provide all that is necessary to interpret an utterance. Davidson’s 
main thesis presupposes someone who is provided of a conscious that knows the 
315
Filosofi a Unisinos, 10(3):302-316, set/dez 2009
An approach to D. Davidson’s “Radical Interpretation” theory
truth conditions and can be certifi ed in order to interpret. That is, someone that 
can know the world by means of the old subject/object relation. Although this is 
an assumption that Davidson rejects, one can read it between the lines. Radical 
interpretation relies upon truth conditions for a sentence in order to provide 
meaning. How can we deal with both truth and interpretation avoiding at the same 
time the undesirable consequences derived from the commitment with reality’s 
knowledge? Maybe the answer is in the holism. 
The third restriction concerns Davidson’s holism. It is a theory of every thing, 
desire, belief, intention and situation. However, these factors are nothing at all 
without the propositional content of the assertions. The holism would be suitable 
with a return to Wittgenstein’s conception of language games, and of meaning 
by use. There are not just assertions, but infi nite possibilities of languages, says 
Wittgenstein (2001), in Philosophical Investigations. To Davidson, instead, the 
speaker has beliefs and a behavior that have to be interpreted by a theory that 
relies upon meanings and truth conditions. The speakers have to choose the best 
theory to get agreement. But agreement requires pragmatic features of language 
that go beyond the semantic level. To interpret the utterance of a sentence as an 
order it is necessary, following Davidson, to presuppose that the speaker takes a 
certain sentence connected to the uttered sentence as false. If it is a question, there 
is someone who does not know if a certain sentence is true or false. In short, to 
interpret it is necessary to know the circumstances under which a sentence is held as 
true. If so, is not there a pattern structure of language competence that is implicated 
in Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation? And if this is the case, the externalism 
thesis is compromised. In one side the principle of charity demands rationality to 
interpret a sentence as following conditions and situations of a common world, 
and in this sense it requires a lot of deductions. They do not eliminate error or 
ignorance, and error and ignorance do occur. Too much conditions for interpreting 
in one hand, and the strict condition for the meaning of a sentence being its correct 
interpretation what depends upon truth conditions. 
Another diffi culty is that the previous theory and the passing theory are 
requisites for each utterance of a sentence. The imagery that occurs to explain 
this point is the image of fl ashes, slices, little portions of reality, a split vision of 
language and interpretation. But how can one understand one another with so 
many and so special, so focused theories? This looks like a schizophrenic kind of 
communication, it is very diffi cult to understand one another in such a split way. It 
is not an effi cient and easy way to communicate. Although Davidson understands 
that assertions attend to modifi cations due to the situation and to the speaker’s 
attitudes, it is always a sentence that is the unit of meaning and understanding. 
Each sentence is a theory and has its interpretation. The holism says nothing about 
what links sentences. We think that they are linked by the context of discourse that 
provides pragmatic conditions for their interpretation and their use. 
To Davidson meaning by means of truth and interpretation are relative to each 
sentence. Even when Davidson demonstrates that they belong to a whole (social, 
cultural, empiric conditions), the discourse level is not taken into consideration. 
Truth under interpretation is still truth and obeys to semantic rules. Truth conditions 
require test, evidence and confrontation with reality. This confrontation is under a 
theory, under an interpretation4. How can one interpret truth conditions? They are 
available for test, but not for interpretation (there is this paradox: when we have 
truth, there can be no justifi cation and vice versa).
4 Davidson (1991, p. 137) says in the essay Radical Interpretation: “This allows to reconcile the need for a 
semantically articulated structure with a theory testable only at the sentential level”.
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The last restriction in our list is that Davidson gave away reference, reality, language, 
scheme/content, but he did not give away the semantic unit of the sentence and so the 
pragmatic level of the discourse is not attained. In order to understand propaganda, 
for instance, we have to eliminate truth conditions. The unit of the pragmatic level is 
not the sentence, nor its utterance by a speaker, nor the interpretation under a theory. 
The unit of meaning is the speech act, the language games and the infi nite modes of 
using them. Some of them have to be interpreted under truth conditions, but this only 
with sentences that have reference and meaning simultaneously as Frege taught us. 
But this kind of situation is previous to dialogue situations. And more, meaning and 
interpretation are limited to T-sentences. When Davidson claims that meaning is not 
independent from beliefs and desires to explain action and its connection to events, 
it is in order to make behavior coherent by a theory. And then, what comes next? 
Evidence and coherence do not provide yet acceptance, justifi cation, reasons for the 
linguistic behavior, means to understanding one another and acting in connection with 
it. Wittgenstein’s perspective is better to give a more coherent and consistent account of 
reference and meaning: the use of language games in our life forms. But this is another 
discussion that surpasses the limit of this paper.
Besides the charitable principle demands a theory that includes everything that 
supports rationality as a pattern for interpreting language and action. There is the 
necessity to discover a coherent pattern in the agent’s behavior. So actions can be 
explained “in terms of quantifi ed beliefs and desires”, says Davidson (1991, p. 160). 
A theory of interpretation can give meaning to an arbitrary utterance of a member 
of a linguistic community through a theory of truth that allows interpretation of any 
sentence. Those who belong to a linguistic community have “to know such theory, and 
to know that it is the theory of the right kind” (Davidson, 1991, p. 161). To know if that 
is the right theory one has to have a theory, and this characterizes the circularity of the 
argument. Supposing one has the right theory it is a theory that has application just for 
that case. There are no rules to decide (and the principle of charity is too wide) what is 
the right or rational option to interpret and to understand correctly each utterance. Each 
interpretation works as in the story of the Baron of Münchhausen. He had to save himself 
and his horse from being drawn in the sea pulling both from water by his own hair.
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